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GENE PATENTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: LITIGATING
ASSOCIATION FOR MOLECULAR PATHOLOGY V. MYRIAD GENETICS
AND LESSONS MOVING FORWARD
Sandra S. Park*
I want to thank the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology, Mike Frongello, and John Conley for the invitation
and for putting together this terrific symposium. I also want to
acknowledge my fellow symposium presenters, almost all of
whom directly contributed in important ways to the case. Jim
Evans, Bob Cook-Deegan, Andrew Chin, Chris Holman, and Lori
Andrews filed amicus briefs. I extend special and deep
appreciation to Lori, who worked on this issue for many years,
pushed us to take on the case, and did a masterful job with the
amicus briefs on behalf of the American Medical Association and
other medical groups. I am grateful for all of your insights,
support, and friendship.
It is a pleasure to be here. It has been eight months since the
Supreme Court issued its decision in Association for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.,' and in many ways, I am still
processing the journey that led up to the opinion, and what the
future holds. I want to use our time together to talk about the
development of the case and lessons we learned that I think have
interesting implications for biotech patents, patent law and
litigation, as well as patent law advocacy done in the public
interest, moving forward.
* Senior Staff Attorney, ACLU Women's Rights Project. Park represented the
twenty plaintiffs who challenged the BRCA1 and BRCA2 gene patents in the
litigation resulting in Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.,
133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). The views expressed here are her own. The following
are the prepared remarks of Keynote Speaker, Sandra Park, the North Carolina
Journal ofLaw & Technology Symposium, February 21, 2014.
1133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
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I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LITIGATION
A. Origins of the Case
I first started working at the ACLU seven years ago. At the
time, the ACLU had a wonderful science advisor-Tania
Simoncelli-who is not a lawyer but was tasked with identifying
science policy issues that raise civil liberties concerns. The practice
of patenting human genes was one of them.
The ACLU is 94 years old, and over that time our work has
touched on most areas of American law, including other areas of
intellectual property law such as copyright. But until we began
looking into gene patents, the ACLU had never been involved in
patent litigation. The ACLU Women's Right Project, where I
work, was co-created by Ruth Bader Ginsburg in 1972 to advance
gender equality and the civil liberties of women and girls.2 One of
the privileges of my position is that we are empowered to think
expansively about how to truly advance women's rights. Justice
Ginsburg pioneered that approach from the start. She crafted a
strategy of representing men in some of the landmark cases
challenging laws and policies that explicitly discriminated based
on sex or gender.3 Once we decided that a challenge to gene
patents should center on the BRCAl and BRCA2 gene patents, the
issue fit squarely within our mandate because of the direct effects
of these patents on women's health and the restrictions placed on
people's access to their own genetic information. On a more
fundamental level, our commitment to ensuring people's rights to
bodily integrity, human dignity, and scientific freedom gave rise to
a deep discomfort with the notion that the government could grant
rights over pieces of the human body, simply because they are
isolated from the body.
2 AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, FIGHTING SEX STEREOTYPES IN THE LAW:
REFLECTIONS ON 40 YEARS OF THE ACLU WOMEN'S RIGHTS PROJECT (Dec.
2012), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/2012.12.20_released
version of wrp_40th report.pdf
3 See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Weinberger v.
Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
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There was a core group within the ACLU who studied the issue
and advocated internally to take on a challenge to gene patents.
The team included my colleague Chris Hansen from the ACLU
Speech, Privacy & Technology Project, Tania, Aden Fine, Lenora
Lapidus, and me, as well as Dan Ravicher from the Public Patent
Foundation. We received strong support from the ACLU's
Executive Director, Anthony Romero.
We talked with many who had a stake in the issue-patent
experts, geneticists, clinicians, law professors and other scholars,
patient advocates, and patients. These conversations were aimed at
learning about the issue and people's experiences, and to make
sure we were doing the right thing. We wanted to know whether
ending gene patents would serve patient interests and lift existing
barriers to science, medicine, and innovation.
We investigated the effects of these patents, and it was these
consequences that ultimately convinced us to take on the case.4 At
that point, gene patents had been in existence for 25 years, and so
we could examine many years of experience with them, including
research that looked at gene patents and their effects.' And
ultimately, we concluded that this category of patents did not fulfill
the constitutional mandate of Article I that patents must "promote
the progress of science."6 Because isolation of DNA is a
prerequisite step to most serious scientific work with a gene,
including testing, the Patent Office's practice of granting patents
4 For a more detailed description of the policy and legal analysis undertaken,
see Tania Simoncelli & Sandra S. Park, Making the Case Against Gene Patents,
PERSPECTIVES ON SCIENCE (forthcoming 2014).
' See, e.g., Stifling or Stimulating - The Role of Gene Patents in Research and
Genetic Testing: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and
Intellectual Property (Oct. 25, 2007) (statement of Wendy Chung); Mildred K.
Cho et al., Effects of Patents and Licenses on the Provision of Clinical Genetic
Testing Services, 5 J. MOLECULAR DIAGNOSTICS 3, 6 (2003); Kyle Jensen &
Fiona Murray, Intellectual Property Landscape of the Human Genome, 310
SCIENCE 239 (2005); Kimberly Blanton, Corporate Takeover Exploiting the US
Patent System, BOSTON GLOBE MAG., Feb. 24, 2002.
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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on "isolated DNA" gave patent holders the right to exclude all
others from engaging in any scientific work with that gene.7
The most immediate impact of these patents could be seen on
clinical diagnostic testing. Studies established that patent holders
had used their rights to shut down other labs from providing
genetic testing relating to a wide range of conditions, including
hemochromatosis, muscular dystrophy, Long QT syndrome and
others.' I spoke with lab directors who told me they regularly
received cease and desist letters and that they stopped offering
certain genetic tests as a result. Gene patent holders could
determine the type of testing offered, which mutations were looked
for, the cost, and the availability of confirmatory testing, as well as
control the data about a gene.
In the case of the BRCAl and BRCA2 patents, Myriad stopped
other labs that already were doing BRCA testing once it got its
patents, even when they were using different testing methods.9 The
price of its testing went up over time, even as the cost of testing
dropped with technological advancements. Eventually, they
charged over $4000 for their standard test and their testing for
large rearrangements on BRCAl and BRCA2.
For many years, Myriad did not offer testing on certain genetic
large rearrangements that were known in the scientific community
to be correlated to cancer risk, leading to a false negative rate of
12% in patients from high-risk families.10 Even when it began
offering that testing, it chose to package its testing in such a way
that patients would need to order and pay for large rearrangement
7 U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed.
Reg. 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001).
8 Declaration of Mildred Cho, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), available at
https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/freespeech/brca Cho declaration 20090826.pdf
9 Declaration of Arupa Ganguly, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp.
2d 181, available at https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/freespeech/brca Ganguly
declaration_ 20090826.pdf.
10 Tom Walsh et al., Spectrum of Mutations in BRCAl, BRCA2, CHEK2, and
TP53 in Families at High Risk of Breast Cancer, 295 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 1379
(2006).
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testing separately." I met many patients who never received that
testing and thus never had a complete picture of their genetic risk.
Moreover, Myriad did not allow confirmatory testing of
negative results. It stopped sharing the data it collected, interfering
with the ability of the scientific community to work more
collaboratively to determine the clinical significance of less
common genetic variants.12
We were also concerned about studies that showed that these
patents had a chilling effect on research, because researchers knew
that patent holders could seek to assert their rights if their research
on the genes proved to be valuable. 13 And the concept of patenting
individual genes was in conflict with where the science and
technology have led us: inexpensive multi-gene tests to obtain a
fuller understanding of the many genes that are associated with a
particular condition-such as the BROCA test out of the
University of Washington which tests more than 20 genes related
to hereditary breast and ovarian cancer-and whole genome
sequencing.
After consulting with relevant stakeholders, we found that
there was near unanimity within the medical and scientific
communities that ending gene patents would benefit patients,
science, and medicine. So contrary to the rhetoric that surrounded
this case from the beginning, our purpose was not to hurt the
biotech industry or even Myriad-exactly the opposite. Gene
patents were an obstacle to the creation of new tests, tools, and
drugs. Our goal was to end monopolies on genes that prevented
everyone, including industry players, from working with specific
genes. The Nobel Laureate economist Joseph Stiglitz filed a
declaration in our case arguing that the patents impeded
" Supplemental Declaration of Ellen Matloff, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology,
702 F. Supp. 2d 181, available at https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/freespeech/brca
suppdeclaration Matloff 20100120.pdf.
12 Declaration of Elizabeth Swisher, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F.
Supp. 2d 181, available at https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/freespeech/brca
Swisher declaration20090826.pdf.
13 See, e.g., Kenneth G. Huang & Fiona E. Murray, Does Patent Strategy
Shape the Long-run Supply of Public Knowledge? Evidence from Human
Genetics, 52 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1193, 1200 (2009).
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innovation, 14 and other testing laboratories filed amicus briefs
along the way agreeing with our position."
On the question of whether a legal challenge would succeed,
almost everyone we talked with said we would lose in court. Yet,
when we evaluated the legal issues, we concluded that the patents
were invalid under Section 101. We looked closely at the Supreme
Court's precedent on Section 101 of the Patent Act, going back
150 years. While the Court had yet to decide Bilski or Mayo, the
Court again and again affirmed that laws and products of nature
and abstract ideas are not patentable, and that simply removing
something from its natural environment and making trivial changes
to it does not create an invention.16
We still knew that the odds were long and our only chance of
ultimate success would be at the Supreme Court. Regardless of
what happened at the district court, we fully expected an appeal to
the Federal Circuit, which we knew would likely disagree with our
arguments based on their narrow interpretation of the exception to
patent eligibility under Section 101.
However, you are likely to be disappointed if a Supreme Court
decision in your favor is your only goal. The Court takes very few
cases, and as far too many lawyers know, even when you think
you're right on the law, the Court does not always agree. But
unlike some of the other issues we work on, a negative ruling
would not do much harm. The status quo was firmly entrenched,
14 Declaration of Joseph E. Stiglitz, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F.
Supp. 2d 181, available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/2010_01_20_-
Declaration of Joseph E_Stiglitz.pdf.
1 Brief for GeneDx and Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct.
2107 (2013) (No. 12-398), 2013 WL 417733; Brief for Invitae Corporation as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (No. 12-398),
2013 WL 432953.
16 See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980); Funk Bros. Seed Co.
v. Kalo Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948); Am. Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283
U.S. 1 (1931); O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 14 L. Ed. 601 (1853). The
Supreme Court issued two important Section 101 cases while our litigation was
pending. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct.
1289 (2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
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rooted in the Patent Office's policy and the Federal Circuit's tacit
approval of gene patents.17
We therefore considered what could be achieved by pursuing
litigation challenging gene patents beyond a win in the courtroom.
This is a part of lawyering you don't necessarily learn in law
school but is an important element of a public interest lawyer's
job: litigation as one strategy in making institutional, political,
legal, and social change, generally a long and hard process.
So beyond a win in court, we had other overarching goals.
First, we wanted to start a serious public debate about gene
patenting that could ultimately help spur legislative or policy
change. In that respect, we were building on work begun by many
others, including many who became plaintiffs, experts, and amici.
These patents had sparked much controversy early on within the
scientific community. Dr. James Watson, who co-discovered of the
DNA double helix, resigned from the National Institute of Health
("NIH") because he disagreed with the government seeking its
own gene patents." But after the Patent Office came out with its
utility guidelines in 2001, which permitted patents on isolated
DNA but made it more difficult to simply patent expressed
sequence tags ("EST"s), 19 the debate largely died down. With the
exception of the study of gene patents underway by the Health and
Human Services' Secretary's Advisory Committee on Genetics,
Health, and Society,2 0 gene patents were accepted as the status quo
by those in the know.
But most people were not in the know. It is fair to say that
99.9% of the public had no idea that the government was engaged
in this practice before the litigation-and that was true of many
17 Intervet Inc. v. Merial Ltd., 617 F.3d 1282, 1292-96 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Dyk,
J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part).
1 Brief for James D. Watson, Ph.D. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither
Party at 14-15, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (No. 12-398), 2013 WL 432951.
19 ESTs are DNA fragments where the function of the genes from which they
were derived was often unknown.
20 See Secretary's Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health, and Society
(SACGHS), Gene Patents and Licensing Practices and Their Impact on Patient
Access to Genetic Tests (April 2010), available at http://osp.od.nih.gov/sites/
default/files/SACGHSpatents report 2010.pdf.
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patients most directly affected by patented genes. We thought the
litigation could be a tool for public education and lay the
groundwork for policy reform.2 1
We succeeded in changing one important policy on gene
patents, even before the Supreme Court decision: the position of
the U.S. government, which of course issued these patents in the
first place. We sued the Patent Office, along with Myriad, as part
of the case. But once the case reached the Federal Circuit, the
government announced in an amicus brief that they now believed
that patents on isolated DNA were invalid as a matter of law.22 The
government stated that the litigation had caused them to reexamine
their position after consulting with all of the relevant parts of the
federal government, including the NIH. I believe that shift in
government position would never have been expressed without the
litigation, as the Patent Office remained firmly behind its policy.
And perhaps directly naming the government as a defendant in the
original lawsuit forced the government to confront this issue and
its policy head on, leading to the welcome change in its position.
Even if I do not agree with its view on the patent eligibility of
cDNA, I highly commend all of the people within the federal
government who came to this issue with open minds and made this
shift in policy possible, including Neal Katyal, who was the Acting
Solicitor General at the Department of Justice, and Francis Collins,
the Director of the NIH.
A second, much related, goal was to broaden the understanding
of patent law litigation and how it can be used in the public
interest. U.S. patent law is structured, for the most part, to exclude
any explicit consideration of the public interest when it comes to
individual patents or even categories of patents. Unlike many
countries in Europe, there is no conception of the public interest
21 We engaged in a wide range of media and other communications activities,
obtaining mainstream coverage and editorials, and producing our own videos,
blog posts, and infographics. Some can be found at www.aclu.org/genepatents.
22 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at
18, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 653 F.3d 1329
(2011) (No. 2010-1406); see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Neither Party, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (No. 12-398), 2013 WL
390999.
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built into the Patent Act. For that reason, almost all patent
litigation in the United States involves two competitors suing each
other. While the resolution of those cases might sometimes serve a
broader public interest, that is rarely the aim.
We believed that patent law should not be seen as an esoteric
area of law in which only specialists engage. There are social
justice values implicated in what patents are issued, what areas of
research are stymied or encouraged, and which patients are denied
access to their genetic information. We saw the revival of Section
101 as a meaningful doctrine as an important lever to help advance
the public interest by recognizing where patents could impede
innovation and scientific freedom. We also observed that the patent
establishment-by which I mean the patent bar, the Patent Office,
and the Federal Circuit-had accepted that Section 101 had little
meaning. In our view, bringing this lawsuit and asserting Section
101 would help highlight the Supreme Court's Section 101
precedents and spark greater attention to this area of the law and
the public's stake in ensuring that patents promote, rather than
hinder, progress.
B. Key Strategic Decisions
So these goals-to achieve a possible win at the Supreme
Court, to begin a public debate to set the groundwork for policy
change, and to shift patent law doctrine-shaped the decisions we
made in answering some key strategic questions.
1. Who Should Bring the Case?
The case is often referred to as A CL U v. Myriad. But of course
the ACLU was not a plaintiff in the case. We represented twenty
plaintiffs: four national associations of pathologists and geneticists;
six individual geneticists; two genetic counselors; two breast
cancer and women's health groups; and six patients.23
In thinking about the plaintiffs, we approached this as we
would a civil rights case. Who, broadly speaking, was affected?
What coalition could we build? When we started doing our
23 For statements about the plaintiffs and why they brought the suit, see
https://www.aclu.org/free-speech womens-rights/brca-plaintiff-statements.
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outreach, I was surprised to find how siloed the different
stakeholders were on this issue. Many of the most affected patient
groups were not in touch with the clinicians or researchers
concerned about this issue. We helped start some of these
conversations, and ultimately many of these people and
organizations became plaintiffs. They showed the courts that
diverse stakeholders-from the scientists, to the clinicians, to the
patients-were joined in opposing these patents.
Their voices were so important in making the issue of gene
patents come to life, especially the voices of the patients. I want to
name them here because they each contributed so much-Lisbeth
Ceriani, Genae Girard, Runi Limary, Patrice Fortune, Vicky
Thomason, and Kathleen Raker. They spoke about their struggles
with cancer, or with family histories of cancer that terrified them,
and the deeply personal decisions that turned on accessing their
genetic information. Their voices were essential in making this
abstract issue one that we could all understand.
And I also want to recognize the organizations and individual
geneticists and genetics counselors who took a stand. I was so
honored to represent all of them. They each took a risk in joining
this litigation, but they all chose to do so because of the impact on
their patients and medicine: Association for Molecular Pathology,
American College of Medical Genetics, American Society of
Clinical Pathology, College of American Pathologists, Haig
Kazazian, Arupa Ganguly, Wendy Chung, Harry Ostrer, David
Ledbetter, Steve Warren, Elsa Reich, and Ellen Matloff. Incredibly
distinguished clinicians and researchers in their own right, many
had a long history of opposing gene patents. Being able to partner
with them and draw on their knowledge was critical.
And there were two women's health and breast cancer
organizations that saw this issue as a matter of social justice for
women and breast cancer patients: Breast Cancer Action, and Our
Bodies Ourselves. They were key in explaining the significance of
gene patents to communities working with patients and on
women's health.
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2. Who Should be Sued?
The next question we had to grapple with was who should be
sued? We sued the Patent Office along with the patent holders-
Myriad and the University of Utah-to place the spotlight on the
government's practice of granting these patents in the first place.
We wanted this case to squarely challenge that practice and not
just be a narrow attack on Myriad's patents. In terms of which
gene patents to challenge, we decided on Myriad's BRCAl and
BRCA2 patents for several reasons. Myriad had enforced its
patents aggressively and had a monopoly on the clinical testing
market. There were many laboratories that wanted and were
capable of performing BRCA testing. And BRCA testing was vital
to many patients, who lacked access or were being harmed in other
ways due to Myriad's monopoly.
3. What Legal Claims Should Be Brought?
A third question we had to answer was whether we should
challenge the patent claims only on Section 101 or on other patent
law grounds, such as obviousness. Many experts we spoke to urged
us to bring an obviousness challenge to the claims, and we
recognized that these claims were indeed vulnerable on
obviousness grounds.2 4
Ultimately, we determined that Section 101's prohibition on
patenting laws and products of nature was best suited for asserting
the larger public interest in opposing gene patents. A court might
prefer to focus on a narrower patent law ground, rather than
Section 101, and that is certainly an approach we have seen the
Federal Circuit take. But if the case were resolved on obviousness,
that would be a fact-specific inquiry that turned entirely on the
circumstances of Myriad's patents and might not have much
impact beyond this case. And the Supreme Court had signaled its
interest in reaching Section 101 questions, based on their prior
Section 101 cases on laws and products of nature.25
24 In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
25 See, e.g., Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S.
124, 125-39, 165 L. Ed. 2d 399 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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We also brought constitutional claims against the governmental
defendants. We particularly wanted to underline that gene patents
do not promote the progress of science-which is the
constitutional mandate for the patent system as set out in Article I.
Moreover, by allowing Myriad to monopolize particular areas of
scientific inquiry-namely study of the BRCAl and BRCA2
genes-the government's grant of the patents violated the First
Amendment's guarantees of freedom of thought and inquiry,
which are considered essential to the freedom of speech. 26 As far as
we know, this was the first First Amendment claim brought
challenging patents. However, the courts never reached the
constitutional issues because we succeeded at the district court in
dismissing the claims under Section 101.27 How courts will
consider the constitutional dimension of patent law is a big issue
that remains to be developed in the future.
II. THE SUPREME COURT OPINION, LESSONS LEARNED, AND
MOVING FORWARD
I am going to fast forward from the filing of the lawsuit in May
2009 to June 2013, when we received the Supreme Court
decision. 28 We were thrilled with the outcome, and especially, that
it was a unanimous decision. The decision adopted our core
argument that under the Court's doctrine, articulated in cases such
as Diamond v. Chakrabarty29 and Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo
Co., 3 0 isolated DNA is a law and product of nature.
The Court affirmed a core principle, which had been ignored
for many years-simply separating the gene from its surrounding
26 We have continued to raise the First Amendment implications of patents.
See Brief for Am. Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, U.S._ (2014) (No. 13-
298), available at https://www.aclu.org/free-speech-technology-and-liberty/
alice-corporation-pty-ltd-v-cls-bank-international-amicus-brief
27 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F.
Supp. 2d 181, 237-38 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
2 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107,
2120 (2013).
29 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
30 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
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genetic material is not an act of invention. Notably, the Court
recognized that Myriad's claims were "concerned primarily with
the information contained in the genetic sequence, not with the
specific chemical composition of a particular molecule."3 1 And the
Court rejected giving any deference to the Patent Office's practice
of awarding gene patents. The Court did not agree with us on the
patent-ineligibility of cDNA, but left open the question of whether
cDNA might be unpatentable on other grounds such as
obviousness.
In conclusion, I want to talk about some lessons and questions
raised by the litigation that I think we will continue to need to
grapple with as we move forward.
One major lesson of the Myriad litigation is that patent law,
like other areas of law, benefits from understanding all of the
stakeholders' experiences with the patents at issue. I believe it is
because the voices of patients, geneticists, and others were absent
from the patent process that we faced a situation where gene
patents had been issued for 25 years without any legal challenge as
to whether they were patentable subject matter in the first place.
The patent system has few mechanisms to hear from stakeholders
beyond the patent applicants before patents are issued or take into
account the broader public interest. Yet, the Justices, as the U.S.
government did, took a more expansive view of the impact of these
patents. They did not accept the automatic assumption that all
patents promote progress. The Court rejected deference to the
Patent Office or industry, and instead described how the patents
stopped clinicians like Dr. Ostrer from offering testing services to
women patients.
The Myriad case can also be seen as a case study in bridging
the two distinct cultures of law and science.32 From the start, we
seriously considered how we, as primarily non-patent attorneys,
could most effectively frame a patent lawsuit that we hoped would
eventually reach the Supreme Court. Myriad's overall strategy was
to try to make this issue seem as complicated as possible and
beyond the understanding of non-scientist mortals. They focused
3 1 Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2118.
32 See Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2 (2010).
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on the difficulty of the process of isolation-even though difficulty
in and of itself is not a sufficient reason under the law to get a
patent. At oral argument, one of Myriad's attorneys claimed
ignorance about some of the nuances of science, saying that he was
only an English major.33
Our approach to bridging the law and science was twofold:
first, effective use of experts. We worked with some of the most
renowned scientists in the country and even the world to translate
the science and break it down so that it could be more easily
synthesized with the law. Myriad's primary expert on the science,
similar to Myriad's overall strategy, conflated and confused some
of the scientific concepts. We were able to rebut these effectively
by focusing on the characteristics of isolated DNA. 34
We also used analogies as a way of bridging the two cultures. I
would say about half of the conversations and debates that Chris
Hansen and I had during the course of litigation were over which
analogies to use in our briefs and hearings. We knew they would
be important for non-scientists to understand the science of the
case.
Myriad never identified an analogy that could illustrate the
stopping point for their argument. Before the Federal Circuit, they
conceded that elemental lithium would be patentable. 35 Before the
Supreme Court, their attorney seemed to suggest that the only
reason parts of the kidney or liver would not be patentable is
33 Oral Argument, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
34 See, e.g., Declaration of Robert L. Nussbaum, Ass'n for Molecular
Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y.
2010), available at https://www.aclu.org/free-speech-womens-rights/brca-
declaration-robert-l-nussbaum-md; Declaration of Roger D. Klein, Ass'n for
Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, available at https://www.aclu.org/
free-speech-womens-rights/brca-declaration-roger-d-klein.
35 Oral Argument, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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because we were already aware of them, not because they are parts
of the human body.36
How did these strategies play out in court? At the district court,
we drew a judge who was excited to delve into the scientific
principles, though he acknowledged the difficulty of doing so. We
also were very lucky that Judge Sweet had a law clerk with a Ph.D.
in molecular biology to assist him in writing a 150-page, legally
and scientifically sound, opinion.
At the Federal Circuit, Judge Lourie focused on a new
scientific distinction, one that Myriad had not argued-the
breaking of covalent bonds-which he developed as an argument
based on his background in chemistry.37 In contrast, Judge Bryson
emphasized that genetics, not chemistry, should be the relevant
lens through which to examine the claims.38 So the Federal Circuit
debated even the field of science that should apply in
understanding the claims and applying the law.
Judge Moore took a different approach to melding the science
and the law-in her view, it was not a simple question of applying
the law to the science as she understood it. She openly
acknowledged that if she were working from a blank slate, she
would have likely found the patents on the full-length genes
invalid.3 9 But ultimately she deferred to industry reliance on patents
that the Patent Office had issued for many years. The prevailing
legal understanding trumped what might be the current application
of law to science.
At the Supreme Court, our strategies largely succeeded. We
had built up a record that explained the science and were helped by
some key amicus briefs, including a brief by geneticist Eric
Lander.4 0 And during oral argument at the Supreme Court, the
36 Transcript of Oral Argument at 54-61, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (No.
12-398), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral arguments/argument
transcripts/12-398-amc7.pdf
3 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 689
F.3d 1303, 1308-37 (Fed Cir. 2012).
38 Id. at 1348-54.
39 1d. at 1343, 1358.
40 Brief for Eric Lander as Amicus Curie Supporting Neither Party, Myriad,
133 S. Ct. 2107 (No. 12-398), 2013 WL 432959.
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justices clearly sought to figure out the application of law to
science by use of analogies-from thinking about the ingredients
for chocolate chip cookies to making a bat from the branch of a
tree.41 Many commented on these analogies, including faulting the
justices for relying on them. I agree that it certainly matters how
good your analogies are. But all of common law is premised on
drawing analogies. We take principles and examples from other
cases to build the law.
Lastly, the lawsuit sought to address and overcome significant
institutional and procedural barriers that severely limit public
access and understanding of the patent system. We made
considerable progress, but there are still major obstacles. The filing
of the lawsuit by an amazing coalition, and the support they
received from diverse experts and amici, showed how public
interest patent litigation can be brought. Daunting barriers to public
interest litigation in patent law include the expense of lawsuits and
the aversion of most attorneys to science. We were able to
overcome both by rallying the institutional resources of the ACLU,
and being open to learning the science with the aid of experts.
If we had not taken on this issue, it is very possible that no case
would ever have been brought challenging these or similar patents.
Patent law insiders believed that Section 101 was dead letter law,
and even if they disagreed with the Patent Office's policy on gene
patents, they assumed that the Federal Circuit would be the last
word and that the Court of Appeals would never uphold these
patents. Additionally, members of the patent bar generally were
focused on those who controlled these patents, not on those
negatively impacted by them. Our public interest orientation meant
that we could frame the legal issue as one with major societal
impact that the courts should-and ultimately did-care about.
There are still substantial institutional and procedural
impediments to vindicating the public interest in patent law. We
are seeing it play out with the post-Supreme Court litigation, where
Myriad sued some companies who began offering BRCA genetic
testing. Given the monopoly Myriad has enjoyed, it appears that it
41 Transcript of Oral Argument at 35-37, 48, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (No.
12-398).
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will litigate to protect it for as long as possible.42 Notably, other
companies decided to affirmatively sue Myriad.43 We believe that
the Supreme Court's reasoning should apply to invalidate any
patents that would authorize Myriad to maintain its monopoly on
any examination of the BRCAl and BRCA2 genes.4 4 But it is a
difficult situation for labs that may want to offer testing and cannot
afford the threat of litigation. One commentator has called
Myriad's actions another form of patent trolling. 45
Another procedural hurdle is the doctrine of standing-who
can bring a case. It is a barrier that we deal with in civil rights
litigation all of the time. The Federal Circuit held that only Dr.
Harry Ostrer had standing because he had received direct
communication from Myriad. Yet, the court recognized that
Myriad's patent enforcement actions had not just affected Dr.
Ostrer, but also forced every other similarly situated researcher and
institution to refrain from BRCA genetic testing.46 That certainly
included other geneticists and pathologists that we represented.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court did not review this issue, and
ultimately it did not affect the outcome because Dr. Ostrer had
standing. It was troubling, however, that the Federal Circuit did not
recognize the standing of other plaintiffs, who under traditional
standing law should have the right to bring a case. That limited
view of standing could affect attempts in the future to bring patent
law litigation like this one.
42 See, e.g., In re BRCA1- and BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test Patent
Litigation, No. 2:13-cv-00640-RJS, 2014 WL 931057, at *1 (D. Utah filed
March 10, 2014).
43 Id.
' See generally Brief for Am. Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Appellee, Univ. of Utah Research Found. v. Ambry Genetics Corp.
(Fed. Cir. June 9, 2014) (Nos. 14-1361, -1366), available at https://www.
aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/brief of aclu et al._as amici curiaein supp
ort of appellee.pdf (arguing that Myriad's motion for a preliminary injunction
should be denied because its asserted patent claims are invalid under Section
101 and the public interest would be undermined).
45 See Timothy B. Lee, Patent Trolls Have A Surprising Ally: Universities,
WASH. POST (Nov. 30, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com-/blogs/the-
switch/wp/2013/11/30/patent-trolls-have-a-surprising-ally-universities.
46 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689
F.3d 1303, 1308-09, 1320-21, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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While the case broke down some of the barriers to broader
public engagement in patent law issues, the patent world is still
fairly insular. The Patent Office issued guidance immediately after
the Supreme Court decision, stating it would no longer approve
patents on isolated nucleic acids,47 yet we have seen problematic
patents issued post-Mayo. As new issues arise with how the Patent
Office responds to the Myriad and Mayo decisions, there will
certainly need to be ongoing collaboration among all the different
stakeholders-clinicians, scientists, lawyers, patients, and others.
We now have a strong foundation for those partnerships. For me
personally, those discussions and collaborations were the best and
most fulfilling parts of working on the case. And that's why I
appreciate this opportunity to begin a conversation with all of you
about these issues. I look forward to your questions.
47 Andrew H. Hirshfeld, Deputy Comm'r for Patent Examination Policy,
Supreme Court Decision in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE (June 13, 2013), http://
www.uspto.gov/patents/law/exam/myriad 20130613.pdf; see also Andrew H.
Hirshfeld, Deputy Comm'r for Patent Examination Policy, 2014 Procedure For
Subject Matter Eligibility Analysis Of Claims Reciting Or Involving Laws of
Nature/Natural Principles, Natural Phenomena, And/Or Natural Products, U.S.
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.uspto.gov/patents/
law/exam/myriad-mayoguidance.pdf (providing additional guidance regarding
the Myriad, Mayo, and other Section 101 decisions).
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